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In the two decades since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) put down 
the 1989 student protest movement, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) has enjoyed not only stunning economic growth but impressive 
political stability as well. Political elites have maintained considerable 
solidarity, and at least until quite recently, power struggles and policy 
disputes at the CCP’s top levels never posed any serious threat to the 
collective leadership or its succession arrangements. Chinese society 
was reasonably stable too. Social protests have risen dramatically in 
number since the early 1990s, but most have remained isolated and con-
strained. Rather than threatening the CCP regime’s ability to survive, 
routinized popular contention has become a form of interest articulation, 
and as such has actually helped the political system to achieve a certain 
degree of responsiveness and accountability.1 
No wonder, then, that starting about a decade ago the topic of “au-
thoritarian resilience” became a feature in the field of China studies. In 
2012, however, some evidence began to suggest that the CCP regime’s 
stability may be more fragile than had been thought, and that even if a 
“tipping point” had not yet been reached, perhaps the system has begun 
teetering. The smooth process by which the so-called fifth generation of 
leaders was set to take over at the Eighteenth Party Congress was thrown 
into question when a massive scandal erupted around Bo Xilai, the CCP 
chief of Chongqing and a contender for the top ruling body, the Standing 
Committee of the CCP Politburo. Along with power struggles, debates 
over policy and ideology among Party leaders and intellectuals have 
been intensifying. President Hu Jintao’s decade-old “no debates” policy 
seems as if it may be reaching the end of its shelf life. 
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In society at large, popular contention is nowhere close to getting 
out of control. Yet there remain reasons to wonder whether the current 
system of weiwen (stability maintenance) can continue. The CCP lead-
ership is clearly anxious to keep it going, and weiwen has become a pri-
ority. Never before has the CCP devoted so many resources to this task. 
Almost the entire party-state apparatus is mobilized behind it, at a high 
and increasing cost that includes excessive and often illegitimate uses 
of force. What is worse, the system backfires regularly by inadvertently 
encouraging people to engage in “troublemaking” activities.
As many scholars have noted, the difficulties that the CCP is now 
experiencing can be partly explained by a variety of social changes that 
have posed new challenges to political authoritarianism. The informa-
tion revolution, especially in the form of social media, has made collec-
tive action easier. The transition to a market economy has also released 
ordinary people from the danwei (work-unit) system and many other 
social-control mechanisms. 
Ultimately, however, the difficulties that the stability-maintenance 
approach is now facing in China should be ascribed to institutional 
weakness. The all-encompassing weiwen system—which includes ev-
erything from secret-police agencies to courts and petition-receiving 
offices that can be used to press popular claims—is good at respond-
ing to challenges in the short term, but creates many serious long-term 
problems along the way. 
In order to grasp the problematic nature of the weiwen system, it 
helps to know something about its source. It is the product of two com-
peting forces: 1) the CCP’s efforts to institutionalize its political struc-
ture, and 2) the influential legacy of Chairman Mao Zedong. Shortly 
after the turbulent Mao years, which concluded with the Cultural Revo-
lution that raged from 1966 through his death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping 
and other leaders decided to overhaul the political system. Deng blamed 
the CCP’s mistakes under Mao on a lack of good institutions.
The political reforms of the 1980s had two main aims: 1) to differ-
entiate the CCP from the government, and 2) to establish formal rules 
and norms. Putting space between the Party and the state was thought 
essential to solving the problem of Party officials with too much power 
and responsibility. 
Party officials were told to focus on “Party affairs” rather than the 
direct running of state agencies, mass organizations, media outlets, and 
state-owned enterprises. Deng and his fellow reformers took this step 
not to undermine the CCP’s political monopoly, of course, but rather 
to make the Party more effective by relieving it of distracting admin-
istrative burdens. Similarly, the move toward formal rules and proce-
dures—including an extensive legal-reform program that began in the 
late 1970s—was meant to promote long-term stability and the rational 
governance of a burgeoning market economy.
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The reformers wanted to part with problematic Maoist politics, but 
Mao’s legacies turned out to be very resilient.2 Mao’s resentment of dif-
ferentiated and formal institutions and his romance with mass mobiliza-
tion have continued to shape developments long after his death. When-
ever reforms run into difficulties and 
the CCP seems threatened, its leaders 
tend to fall back on Maoist methods. 
After the CCP regime’s “close call” 
with the 1989 student movement, for 
example, almost all reforms aimed at 
separating the Communist Party from 
the government came to a halt. For 
Deng and his colleagues, the move-
ment was a wake-up call. The will-
ingness of so many party-state agen-
cies to support the protesting students 
suggested that institutional differentiation and political liberalization 
would endanger the Party’s grip on power. Then came the collapse of 
the Soviet and East European socialist regimes, underlining the danger 
that institutional reforms resembling Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) could lead to a loss 
of political control. 
 The CCP thus largely aborted reforms that encouraged relatively au-
tonomous identities for public and semipublic agencies. Instead, it began 
to reassert direct control over the People’s Congresses (China’s many 
elected local legislatures), mass organizations such as labor unions, and 
the media. Of course, institutionalization in the classic style first de-
scribed by Max Weber did not stop entirely after 1989. For instance, 
legal-system reforms continued into the 1990s and 2000s. As Andrew 
Nathan has observed, institutionalization also made great progress with 
respect to collective leadership, succession, and a variety of other areas, 
even though many new norms and procedures were informal.3
In the 2000s, when the CCP’s leaders began to feel threatened by the 
rise of popular contention and moved to strengthen the weiwen system, 
they once again slipped into grooves that Mao had carved. In order to 
cope with rampant protests, riots, and other “emergency events,” they 
looked for a system that could mobilize all kinds of resources and act 
quickly. For such a task, they concluded, relatively autonomous insti-
tutions that act according to their institutional interests and are con-
strained by rigid rules and procedures are not a good fit. 
Paradoxically, China’s market-based economic success and the re-
cent financial difficulties of the West have furnished additional reasons 
for following the Maoist tradition. In Chinese leaders’ eyes, the West’s 
economic troubles discredit the “Western model” of democracy, the rule 
of law, separation of powers, and independent media. Has not China’s 
In Chinese leaders’ eyes, 
the West’s economic 
troubles discredit the 
“Western model” of dem-
ocracy, the rule of law, 
separation of powers, and 
independent media. 
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recent success, they ask, proven the strengths of the CCP, especially its 
power to marshal resources in pursuit of key goals? 
Given this thinking, it is no surprise that the weiwen system rests on 
a highly centralized power structure. Through it, Party leaders super-
vise and coordinate a bewildering and overlapping range of agencies—
including police, surveillance, and propaganda organizations—dedi-
cated to preserving social stability. The system’s scope is remarkable. 
It includes not only state offices but also state-owned enterprises, semi-
public bodies, and even private businesses. For example, many tele-
communication companies and Internet service providers are required 
to conduct surveillance and censorship. At the same time, the system 
has a hierarchical structure that reaches from the central government 
all the way down to neighborhood and village committees throughout 
urban and rural areas alike. Such an all-embracing apparatus can usu-
ally identify and respond to any threats quickly and forcefully. 
Yet the system does not rely solely on surveillance and repression. 
The CCP’s leaders understand that they also need the means to address 
social conflicts and popular grievances. This is where the courts and the 
xinfang (petition) system come in. 
The development of the judicial system illustrates very well the ten-
sion between institutionalization and the Maoist legacy. For thirty years, 
China has been undertaking legal reforms. Taken together, they form 
one of the best examples of the CCP’s efforts to institutionalize the po-
litical structure. There have been great strides toward increased profes-
sionalism, more regular procedures, and the creation of a proper legal 
infrastructure. The courts have acquired a relatively distinctive insti-
tutional identity, and for a time even looked as if they were part of an 
evolution toward the rule of law. 
About a decade ago, however, Party leaders began steering the court 
system toward Maoist populism. They took to warning against legal 
“Westernization” and insisted that Chinese courts should follow their 
own path. Adjudication and formality were downplayed in favor of me-
diation. Taking inspiration from the Maoist era, CCP higher-ups also 
warned judges and lawyers that they should take care to be responsive to 
“public views” and the “mass line.” One of the Party’s favorite methods 
for resolving legal disputes, known as “Ma Xiwu adjudication,” stresses 
informality and morality over rules and laws. It stems from the revolu-
tionary era.4
The development of the xinfang system also reveals Mao’s continuing 
influence. It was Mao who first installed it as the channel through which 
Party leaders could receive complaints from ordinary people. Unlike 
most other authoritarian regimes, which go to considerable lengths to 
claim that they are liberal democracies, the PRC explicitly rejects liberal 
democracy and instead relies on the “mass line” as the main means of 
interest representation. According to this doctrine, CCP officials should 
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hold extensive consultations with interested parties both before and af-
ter setting public policy. Petitions are important because they give “the 
masses” (to use Maoist jargon) an approved means for communicating 
with the Party elite. 
But this system is inefficient at articulating interests and tends to 
encourage “troublemaking” petitioning tactics. In the highly centralized 
power structure, only leaders can effectively address popular claims. 
Inevitably, however, those with real power can only deal with a relative 
handful of petitions. In order to get attention, then, petitioners resort to 
disruptive tactics. At the same time, many local officials dislike peti-
tions and may neglect or even obstruct them. 
The CCP has tried to institutionalize xinfang, laying down rules and 
strengthening complaint-hearing bodies. Yet the system’s combination 
of centralism and populism makes it resistant to institutional differentia-
tion and formal procedures. No one takes the rules seriously. Petition-
ers often jump channels and try to go straight to higher-ups. A favorite 
means for this is to stage a large collective action. The rules say that no 
more than five people are supposed to deliver a petition, but it is well 
known that officials will take a petition with a crowd behind it more 
seriously than they will take an ordinary petition. 
The story of the court and xinfang systems shows that when it comes 
to institutionalization, the CCP’s leaders are of two minds. They know 
that it is useful for dealing with disputes and popular claims. Yet cen-
tralized power unconstrained by formal rules often seems to them just as 
needful, and even better at “solving problems.”
An Unsustainable Model
How effective is the weiwen system? It is certainly good at removing 
“malicious” Internet posts and at bringing force to bear to suppress pro-
tests. The PRC party-state still commands vast resources and is capable 
of quick action. Yet three shortcomings of the system make it a poor bet 
for the long term. 
First, its cost is enormous and rising. In 2011, the National People’s 
Congress allocated the equivalent of US$95 billion to law and order. 
That staggering sum—it was slightly more than the PRC’s military bud-
get for that year—in fact paid for only a small part of the whole weiwen 
system. Much stability-related work is done “off-budget” by party-state 
agencies, state-owned enterprises, and private businesses. Then too, fi-
nancial expenditures are not the only costs of the weiwen system, which 
also eats up less tangible public resources such as the time and attention 
of state officials. 
The system is so costly in part because the party-state’s sheer capac-
ity for mobilizing resources breeds “overkill,” especially when officials 
believe that the problem they are tackling is urgent. For example, local 
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officials in Shandong Province reportedly spent close to $10 million 
over the past few years on efforts to control the well-known blind law-
yer and rights activist Chen Guangcheng before his recent exile to the 
United States.5 This may be an extreme case, but it is not uncommon for 
local governments to spend substantial sums on a single petitioner deter-
mined enough to spend years petitioning Beijing or a provincial capital. 
The quest for stability, in a populist climate that does not value in-
stitutional boundaries and formal procedures, often spurs government 
functionaries to go way beyond their nominal roles in order to pacify 
protesters. When relatives of someone killed in a Hubei Province traffic 
incident failed to gain satisfactory compensation from the driver, they 
repeatedly staged disruptive protests in order to pressure the police. Al-
though not legally bound to, stability-conscious police officials helped 
the family to find a lawyer and even went with them to court. When the 
lawsuit failed because the uninsured driver was poor, the police depart-
ment paid the family from its own official funds and even took up a col-
lection among its officers. This sort of thing of course encourages more 
protests—and more extraordinary actions to mollify protestors—in a 
cycle that threatens to drive weiwen costs up indefinitely. 
The second problem of the weiwen system is that it tends to under-
mine the CCP regime’s legitimacy by producing excessive and illegiti-
mate uses of force. It is not surprising that such a formidable machine 
of social control can trigger excessive coercion. The system holds lo-
cal officials strictly responsible; a single serious breakdown of order is 
enough to destroy careers. Internet surveillance and the security camer-
as that are now common in Chinese cities can provide nervous officials 
with targets for repression that they may go after rather than risk the 
“firing offense” of allowing a major disturbance to develop.
Here we see another of the system’s contradictions: It tends to gen-
erate a high demand for force, but at the same time it needs and wants 
that force to be legitimate. Thus there exists a thicket of restrictions 
on how and when local authorities may use official force. But the 
restrictions serve all too often to drive coercion into the realm of in-
formality and illegality. Officials following regular procedures may 
not be able to use force, but they can and do pay temporary staffers, 
private security firms, or even criminal gangs to do so. Such violence 
is frequently not only excessive but covert. Some local governments 
have used secret and substandard “black prisons” (hei jianyu) and 
even mental hospitals to deal with troublesome petitioners.6 Many 
private security firms are abusive and poorly disciplined. One of the 
most notorious, Beijing’s Anyuanding Security Company, hired out 
more than three-thousand guards to local governments looking for 
help in dealing with petitioners. Using force to excess and without 
legitimacy can hardly be good for regime stability. Here is another 
price of the weiwen system.
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The weiwen system’s final drawback is its perverse tendency to en-
courage unruly behavior. When the CCP’s fondness for the “mass line” 
meets the instrumentalist attitude toward legality that is common within 
both officialdom and society at large, 
the result is contempt for rules and 
forms. Courts and agencies will bend 
the law to keep boisterous petition-
ers quiet, so ordinary Chinese citizens 
(provided they calculate that repres-
sion is not a major risk) have learned 
to “act out” in order to guard their in-
terests or boost their bargaining power. 
Compensation for houses demolished 
under eminent domain is often mini-
mal, but a few homeowners with the 
nerve to “make trouble” have received 
excessive payouts. Similarly, judges 
have received orders from on high to 
keep working with unhappy litigants even after their cases have been 
formally decided when the litigants resorted to “troublemaking” peti-
tions. Following the principle of “the squeaky wheel gets the grease” 
in order to keep the peace certainly holds the danger of teaching people 
that disruptive tactics are a shortcut to special treatment. 
The defects of the current weiwen system are no secret. During my re-
cent field trips to Hunan and Hubei provinces, I heard judges and police 
officers ruefully say, “The more weiwen, the more instability.” If even 
low-ranking officials know that the system has fundamental problems, 
why have CCP leaders not tried to change it? 
The main answer, I believe, is that reforms are fraught with risk. If 
China’s rulers want to maintain stability on a solid institutional base, 
they will need to initiate changes that will differentiate and liberalize 
the political system. From their experiences in the 1980s, however, 
they have taken away the lesson that such a move may ultimately en-
danger their monopoly on power. As long as the economy is growing 
rapidly and elites and ordinary people alike are mostly content with 
the status quo, putting off such a risky step will seem understandable 
and even sensible. If crisis or a sense of crisis supervenes, however, 
calculations may change. If rejecting reform seems likely to trigger 
a sudden regime collapse, embracing gradual political change may 
come to seem like a good way to gain a degree (perhaps even years) 
of breathing room.
The year 2012 was likely not a tipping point, but it was a year in 
which (to change the metaphor) many cracks in the façade of regime 
stability began to appear. From the standpoint of China’s leaders, there-
fore, the year 2013 is probably a good time to begin a reckoning. 
If crisis or a sense of 
crisis supervenes, calcu-
lations may change. If 
rejecting reform seems 
likely to trigger a sudden 
regime collapse, embrac-
ing gradual political 
change may come to seem 
like a good way to gain 
breathing room.
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